NYS voting machine decision
Other than the law - why we are moving away from lever machines is simply beyond me.
(January 25, 2008) — SARATOGA SPRINGS — State elections commissioners on Thursday approved the use of paper-ballot marking devices and scanners for the disabled later this year, potentially paving the way for all electors to vote on that kind of system rather than ATM-style touch-screen machines.
[snip]
Based on Thursday’s action, county commissioners can pick from a field of three machines. All are devices that allow voters with disabilities to mark and verify their paper ballots and have them optically scanned. No ATM-style touch-screen machines were included, although Republican state commissioners had wanted at least one.
Yea. Paper ballots. Not ATM machines. The plan to use these machines in September - a few here and there..
Oh, I heard on WXXI (no link) that the makers of ATMs are going to sue. Someone from the crew here at RT will update ths post with a link when available. There is also a public demonstration of these machines some where I didn’t catch but we will post that information as well.
If you know it - add it to the comments and we will front page it.
Related posts:
Just spoke to the BOE. The demonstration is scheduled for January 31st from 12:00-6:30 at Medley Center in Irondequoit.
It’s on the PDC Calendar as well.
And what will a public demonstration of ATM style voting machines prove? That the technology works? Of course, we know that. The issue is, and has always been, security. Can these machines be hacked? Are the voting totals accurate? There have been numerous demonstrations that the electronic voting machines can be easily hacked. The companies that write the software won’t turn over copies of the software to the public for inspection, so why should we believe the machines are secure? Because they were demonstrated in public? Ridiculous.
Along the same lines, Stlo7 doesn’t mention this, but the lever machines are about as secure as can be. The levers turn a counting device in a sealed and secure part of the machine, which cannot be opened by voters or election officials without breaking the seal. Once it is time to count the votes, the seal is inspected to see if it is intact, then the seal is broken and the votes can be seen by representatives of all parties. (Unlike the electronic voting machines, where you can open the computer case, or insert a bogus count via any one of a number of computer ports, undetected …)
I hope the D&C article is correct, that in 2009 NY State will go to optical scan/paper trail voting machines. I believe there must be paper trail that can be used for audits and recounts, and the optical scan method satisfies those requirements.
It’s a real shame that the NYS government is so philosophically opposed to Open Source, because whatever system we use will doubtless include a computer system that can be hacked. And when I say “philosophically,” I mean there is not philosophy other than the almighty dollar, and things that are free are verboten.
Please elaborate. How does “Open Source†guarantee (or enhance) voting security?
By creating a system of open standards for all voting machines which can be independently tested and verified. The alternative is what you’re complaining (rightfully) about: proprietary systems owned by companies who’s political aspirations are unknown and untrusted.
I’ve said for a long time that what is needed is an open source consortium of gear-heads who can put together a system which can be held up as an ISO-style model. That way, just as with ISO, as states begin adopting the new standard, it increases it’s legitimacy, forcing other states to follow suit without trampling on states rights.
I think paper receipts are swell. But let’s not forget that what the paper says and what get’s tallied may not be the same. Let’s also not forget that most people throw such pieces of paper out the minute they get them. Good to have backup, good to have some measure of confirmation, but if the system is inherently untrustworthy, that’s the problem that needs addressing first. Its really odd, but even computer people I talk to about this often don’t see it this way.
This explains everything:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GzPXer7946E
And here, a Princeton study reveals Diebold flaws:
http://www.fliggo.com/video/FrvJDAUx
The paper receipts from voting are for the auditors, not the voters. They would not be thrown out, they are to be kept for potential future audits or recounts. It would be nice if the law required the receipts to be kept  it may say that, but I’m no expert.